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Theo A. F. Kuipers
ON DESIGNING HISTORICALLY ADEQUATE
FORMAL RECONSTRUCTIONS
REPLY TO ERIC SCERRI 
Scerri’s review of the first (1988) paper by Hinne Hettema and me21 on the 
periodic table ended with the statement: “To conclude, I believe that the 
periodic table of the elements has yet to be axiomatized successfully, although 
the bold attempt by Hettema and Kuipers has raised a number of key issues in 
the philosophy of chemistry” (p. 239). The concluding section of his present 
review of our revised version, of 2000, begins with: “After devoting so much 
space to criticizing the views of Hettema and Kuipers I would like to conclude 
by saying that they are to be applauded for undertaking the very difficult 
problem of the reduction of chemistry.” In view of Scerri’s even more severe 
criticisms in the second review, its concluding statement is an even more 
generous statement than that of the first review. Hence, we have at least to 
concede that even the second version of our reconstruction and further 
discussion of the periodic table leaves much to be desired.
As Scerri has noticed, we did not respond in all relevant respects to his first 
criticisms. Apart from the fact that there was not much time between the 
appearance of Scerri’s paper and the deadline for the revised version, it was 
also clear that a lot of new research would be necessary for a thorough 
revision. We should like to thank Scerri for his effort to clarify and elaborate a 
number of points in his present review. Together with the other critical points 
of his first review, they will certainly be of great help to somebody who might 
want to undertake a third attempt, in particular regarding the reduction of the 
periodic table. 
Certainly, the main lesson to be drawn is that designing historically 
adequate formal reconstructions is an enormous job, not in the least “due to the 
difficulty of the problems it [chemistry] presents” as Scerri remarks. But it is 
worthwhile, for it will “deepen our knowledge of the phenomena” as he also 
                                                          
21  This reply continues in the ‘we’ form for it is also on behalf of Hettema, although he maintains 
that this reply is too apologetic.
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suggests. Moreover, we would like to add, although our reconstructions of a 
naïve and a refined version of the periodic table were in many historical 
respects problematic, conceived in purely formal terms they can still perfectly 
illustrate how such structuralist reconstructions may appear like and how they 
can be mutually related and related to other theories. That is, they may at least 
be conceived as toy structuralist examples with heuristic use-value. More 
generally, it is fortunate that Scerri’s paper and some others (e.g. those of Van 
den Bosch and Causey in this volume and of Hamminga in the companion 
volume) draw attention to the structuralist approach. Unfortunately, Wolfgang 
Balzer, one of the pioneers of this approach, was not able to write his intended 
contribution on the relation between the HD-method and the structuralist 
approach.
 For now, we should like briefly to discuss some specific points raised by 
Scerri, and conclude somewhat more extensively on the topic of the 
epistemological status of the periodic table. 
Some Main Points of Full or Qualified Agreement, Sectionwise 
On Section 2. It is indeed overly simplified to claim that Mendeleev designed 
his table with a periodicity of 8, for he was well aware of the possibility of, or 
even the need for different periodicities. In view of Scerri’s Note 1, we are 
afraid that, stimulated by D. Posin’s 1948 book on Mendeleev, we committed 
“formal romanticization,” the main temptation of formal reconstruction. 
Moreover, despite some practical obstacles, we should have consulted Van 
Spronsen (1969).
On Section 3. Our presentation of the three conditions that were sufficient for 
the construction of the periodic table should have been amended in two 
respects: they were conditions as Mendeleev perceived them, with the 
important qualification on the notion of “similar chemical behavior” as 
indicated by Scerri.
On Section 4. Indeed, we did not justify our assumption that the set of 
chemical elements is finite. In view of our Note 2, which leaves room for 
elements to be discovered or artificially created, this assumption seems to 
become even stranger. However, as we should have mentioned, there are 
justifications. To understand these, one only has to investigate whether there is 
a certain value for the atomic number Z at which the electronic theory breaks 
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down in the sense that a stable electronic behavior is no longer possible.22
There are no hard and fast rules to determine how heavy a nucleus can get 
before a quantum theory of its electron cloud becomes problematic. The point 
is most easily seen for the one electron atom, where relativistic quantum 
mechanics, for example, indicates that the heaviest atom theoretically possible 
has an atomic number of the order of 137.23 Beyond this point, depending on 
the theory chosen to describe the electronic behavior, the ground state becomes 
unstable. For instance, according to Bohr’s semi-classical method, the inner 
electrons of an atom with a higher number would have to travel at a speed that 
exceeds that of light, which is physically impossible. Similar boundaries arise 
in modern versions of relativistic quantum mechanics. 
On Sections 4, 5 and 6. Yes, our claim that no experimental problems arose in 
measuring atomic mass and establishing chemical similarity is clearly 
overstated. From the context, however, it was also clear that we only wanted to 
hint at the absence of circularity problems in interpreting the relevant 
experiments related to the periodic table. The beryllium case shows that even 
this claim is false as far as Mendeleev himself is concerned for he apparently 
used arguments from his table. However, as Scerri also reports, in the end 
experiments that were independent of the table settled the valency of 
beryllium. Moreover, as far as we can judge from Scerri’s description, the 
experimental problems around lutetium and lawrencium that have arisen 
recently are also not intrinsically related to the periodic table. To be sure, in all 
cases, the experiments and criticisms are certainly guided by the table, but as 
explained in Ch. 2 of SiS, the periodic table provides perfect illustrations of the 
important distinction between (intrinsically) theory-laden and (merely) theory-
guided observation.
                                                          
22 This leaves aside the discussion of the stability of the nucleus, which is a different theory and a 
different discussion altogether. In the context of this discussion it is conceivable, for instance, that 
a “stable” nucleus with a high Z value, such as 150 or more, would be stable for some time (which 
could be anywhere between a microsecond to a couple of seconds). While such a discovery would 
be highly exciting, the question of whether a stable electronic “cloud” could form around this 
nucleus, and whether therefore a meaningful chemistry would be possible with these heavy atoms, 
is yet another issue. 
23 The number of 137 is not gospel per se. It is, to be precise, derived from either Bohr’s 
semiclassical theory of the atom, or the one-electron Dirac equation with a point nucleus. For 
instance, the Klein-Gordon equation (which does not take spin into account) has a catastrophe 
even when Z > 137/2 (see Itzykson and Zuber 1980). On the other hand, for the one electron atom, 
taking the physical extension of the nucleus into account pushes this point of instability to about 
Z = 175 (Itzykson and Zuber 1980, p. 83).
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On Section 7. Regarding the sophisticated periodic law, it is important to make 
a distinction between its discovery and its status. Scerri is right in claiming that 
it was discovered, by Werner, independently of atomic theory. However, in 
view of the fact that the latter explained the former, with the consequence that 
table-independent measurement of the atomic number became possible, it lost 
its status as a proper theory in the sense of no longer having a proper 
theoretical term, viz. atomic number. Incidentally, we did not claim that the 
elaborate formalization was set up in order “to establish this trivial connection” 
between the naïve and the sophisticated law.
On Section 8. Scerri relativizes our distinction between a chemical and a 
physical conception of the atom, to some extent convincingly. However, he 
might have stressed our remark (reported in his Note 12) that we were 
sketching “the extremes of a gradual transition.” Moreover, regarding ab initio
quantum chemistry we would claim that that does not solve the Schrödinger 
equation atom by atom and that the relevant basis set has a very tenuous 
relationship with the Aufbau principle.
Let us very briefly sketch the practice of ab initio quantum chemistry to 
elucidate this point. In ab initio quantum chemistry the aim is to solve the 
electronic structure problem for either an atom or a molecule. In the most 
commonly practiced method, one chooses a basis set for each atom, and then 
proceeds to compute the overlap, potential, kinetic (1-particle) and coulomb 
and exchange (2-particle) integrals over the functions of the basis set. Using 
these integrals, a Fock matrix is constructed, which is used to iteratively solve 
the Fock equation until the solution is self-consistent. The point is that the 
wavefunction is computationally expressed as a linear combination of orbitals 
(a Slater determinant), which in turn are expressed as a combination of basis 
set functions. The electron correlation problem is generally solved on top of 
this Self-Consistent Field (SCF) wavefunction by either Many Body 
Perturbation Theory (MBPT), Configuration Interaction (CI) or more 
sophisticated methods such as Coupled Cluster (CC). The choice of basis set is 
thus pivotal to the overall quality of the calculation. If a wave function exhibits 
certain properties, these will only be found in the calculation if the original 
basis set was “rich” enough to express these properties. 
The practical problem is that even a simple SCF calculation grows in 
complexity with the fourth power of the number of basis functions, while 
correlated calculations typically grow in complexity with the fifth or sixth 
order of the number of basis functions. The choice of a large basis set, while 
theoretically desirable, will therefore always present practical problems. 
To sum up, we find it hard to see how Scerri’s point that the Schrödinger 
equation is solved atom by atom can be sustained  the integrals that form the 
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basis of the calculation by their very definition extend over the whole 
molecule. If Scerri means to say that basis sets are found atom by atom then 
this is true in the main (though it is neither necessary nor always done). The 
relationship between the basis set and the Aufbau principle has also become 
clear: the basis set needs to furnish, at a minimum, functions of sufficient 
complexity for orbitals with the required properties to be created as determined 
by the expected results of the computational model (correlated calculations can 
require more extensive basis sets to deliver accurate answers than non-
correlated ones; and the calculation of certain electronic properties such as 
dipole moments or polarizabilities requires a different creation of the basis sets 
yet again).
Finally, the reader who is interested in a more documented defense of the 
distinction between the two conceptions of the atom is referred to Hettema 
(2000).
On Section 9. We should have mentioned that our claimed causal correlation 
between “equal outer electron configuration” is an idealization; it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient, as Scerri documents with relevant counter examples. 
Fortunately, such a similar remark is not made regarding the claimed 
identification of the charge of the nucleus and the atomic number. As is clear 
from our presentation, this identity is the core of our reduction claim.
Status as Observational Law or Proper Theory 
Scerri’s Section 10, “Is the periodic table a true theory?”, and some remarks in 
Section 2, give rise to a couple of remarks. Already in the first version we 
claimed that there had been an important transformation of the status of the 
periodic table: from a true theory (in the sense of a proper theory) to an 
observational law. Although Scerri does not agree with us that the table ever 
had the status of a proper theory, we are pleased to note that by stating this 
with such emphasis, he underwrites the existence of this distinction. The 
recognition of the epistemological and methodological importance of this 
distinction almost got lost in philosophy of science, probably due to its 
apparent dependence on an absolute distinction between observational and 
theoretical terms. In Ch. 2 of SiS it is argued extensively, in line with Nagel’s 
original exposition, and using ideas of Hempel and Sneed, that these 
distinctions are independent. 
In Section 2 Scerri even goes so far as to question the law-like status of the 
periodic table in our time in view of “the presumed reduction of this law by 
quantum mechanics.” However, in our view, this claim merely reflects 
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problematic terminology. The idea is, of course, that a general observational 
fact loses its status as an independent law when it can be reduced to a theory. 
However, as Scerri rightly suggests, physical scientists are sometimes inclined 
to withdraw the law-like status altogether as soon as a law can be derived from 
a theory in a certain way. This is unfortunate terminology, because it suggests 
that reduction is a kind of elimination, whereas speaking of a “derived law,” 
after a successful reduction, is the plausible thing to do. 
In Section 10 Scerri elaborates his criticism of our claim that Mendeleev 
implicitly used the notion of an atomic number. Here we are inclined to 
disagree. Of course, by writing ‘implicitly’ we wanted to suggest that, 
although he was not using numbers, as we noted by this remark, he was using 
something that can be represented by numbers. To be precise, Mendeleev used 
a relation, chemical similarity, which was independent of atomic mass. This 
generated his very idea of gaps in the table based on atomic mass and the 
chemical similarity of known elements. The notion of a gap is a theoretical 
term in the sense that the existence of a gap cannot be established without 
using the very ideas underlying the table. And as soon as gaps are postulated, 
the known and unknown chemical elements can be successively numbered. To 
be sure, we should have made this point more explicit.
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